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1. INTRODUCTION
On March 24, 1998, the German federal government enacted
the Dritte Finanzmarktfdrderungsgesetz [3rd Financial Markets Im-
provement Act] ("FMFG").' The FMFG became effective April 1,
1998 and, among other things, established the Investmentaktienge-
sellschaft ("Investment-AG"), or "dosed-end fund," as a new form
of investment company under the Gesetz iiber Kapitalanlagegesell-
schaften [German Investment Company Act] ("KAGG").2 The
German federal government created Investment-AGs with the in-
tention of stimulating the supply of capital to German companies
by opening up new business areas to professional asset managers
in Germany. The legislators expected the amendment to lead to an
additional supply of venture capital for German high-growth
companies, because an Investment-AG is not required to redeem
its shares and was therefore considered particularly well-suited for
venture capital investing.3
Investment companies raise capital from investors and issue
securities in return (so-called "investment certificates"). The in-
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I Dritte Finanzmarktf6rderungsgesetz [3rd Financial Markets Improvement
Act], v. 24.3.1998 (BGBI. I S.529) [hereinafter FMFG].
2 Gesetz ilber Kapitalanlagegesellschaften [German Investment Company
Act], v. 9.9.1998 (BGBI. I S.2726) [hereinafter KAGG].
3 Arguments for the FMFG, Bundestags Drucksache 13/8933 of 1998, at 2, 62
[hereinafter BT-Drucks]; JORGEN BAUR, in HANDBUCH DES KAPITALANLAGERECHTS §
18, no. 32 (Heinz Dieter Assmann & Rolf A. Schfitze eds., Supp. Mar. 1999).
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vestment company's assets are invested in a diverse pool of securi-
ties based on the principle of reducing risk through diversification.
In the case of the traditional "open-end" investment company, if an
investor decides to withdraw from the fund, he or she is entitled to
return his or her investment certificates to the issuer in exchange
for a payment equal to the proportion of the fund's net asset value
("NAV") represented by those certificates.
While the redemption obligation of open-end funds is advan-
tageous for investors, it constitutes a significant burden for fund
management, which must reserve sufficient liquidity to fulfill re-
demptions on short notice.4 Fund managers cope with the re-
demption obligation in a number of different ways. Some fund
managers maintain large cash reserves. However, cash holdings,
including money market securities, generally generate low returns
and adversely affect the fund's performance. Other fund managers
meet redemption requests by selling the fund's portfolio securities.
However, if there is insufficient liquidity for the securities, it may
not be possible to sell the securities at all or they may only be sold
at a substantial loss. Furthermore, retail investors tend to redeem
more during market downturns, when securities markets usually
have the least liquidity.5
In contrast, Investment-AGs are not obliged to redeem their
shares.6 Instead, an investor may dispose of his investment only
by selling the shares in a secondary market or upon liquidation of
the fund.7 Because Investment-AGs do not redeem their shares,
and also because they issue new shares only occasionally (similar
4 Decisive for the procedures are the conditions of the contracts approved by
the German banking authority (Bundesaufichtsamtfuer das Kreditwesen) [BAKred],
which also provide for the conditions under which fund shares are redeemed. See
§ 15, KAGG, para. 3 g. A stay of redemption is only permitted as an exception
pursuant to the strict requirements of section 11, KAGG, paragraph 2, sentence 2.
5 As a reaction of fund investors to the bear market in August 1998, stock
funds in the United States had to cope with net outflows of U.S. $11.2 billion for
the first time since 1990. Cf. Benedikt Fehr, Amerikas Investmentgesellschaften
profitieren van Zug hin zur Aktie, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Nov. 2, 1998,
at 38 (stating a practical example).
6 Pursuant to section 51, KAGG, paragraph 2, sentences 2 & 3, only voting
bearer shares.
7 Therefore, the shares have to be registered for official listing or trade in the
regulated market on a national stock exchange. See § 61, KAGG, para. 3. This is
also a special opportunity for the German regional exchanges to remain dominant
as secondary markets by introducing a segment for closed-end funds. Cf. Jiirgen
Baur, in 5 BANKRECHT UND BANKPRAXIS no. 9/24 (Thorwald Hellner & Stephan
Steuer eds., 2000) (providing references to the government's arguments).
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to a conventional stock corporation), they are called dosed-end
funds.8
The lack of liquidity in venture capital investments is the prin-
ciple justification for creating Investment-AGs. German high-
growth companies requiring venture capital are rarely exchange-
listed companies. 9 In addition, the securities of high-growth com-
panies seeking venture capital are generally not fungible and lack
an active trading market. Therefore, venture capital investments
are illiquid investments per se. An open-end fund that makes
venture capital investments may not be able to redeem investment
certificates. Consequently, open-end funds are not ideal sources of
venture capital for high-growth companies. Investment-AGs, on
the other hand, depend less on liquid markets due to the absence
of a redemption obligation. They are not forced to sell portfolio
holdings unexpectedly to pay off investors.10 This makes Invest-
ment-AGs particularly well-suited for making venture capital in-
vestments or, for that matter, making investments in other illiquid
markets, such as emerging markets."
In spite of the functional advantages of the Investment-AG, the
legislators' expectations have so far remained unfulfilled. No In-
vestment-AG has been created thus far in Germany. One reason
for this is the legal framework of the KAGG, which runs counter to
the purposes behind the Investment-AG. This Essay discusses the
weaknesses of the KAGG. This Essay also suggests a method for
creating an Investment-AG that is both practical and meets the re-
quirements of the KAGG, thereby increasing the potential level of
acceptance for the Investment-AG.
8 For details on the difference between closed-end/open-end funds and the
corporate and contract type, see JORGEN BAUR, INVESTMENTGESETZE 1 Teilband,
Einl. I no. 76 (1997); RODIGER PASLER, HANDBUCH DES INVESTMENTSPARENS 7 (1991).
9 See infra Section 2.2. (discussing the problem of the permitted investment
objects).
10 Cf. THOMAS PAUL & RODIGER P.SLER, DAS DEUTSCHE INVESTMENTRECHT in-
troduction no. 84 (1999) (stating that closed-end funds need not effect "fire-sales"
to obtain liquidity).
11 Karrie McMillan, Issues and Opportunities for Closed-End Funds, in THE '40
Act INsnTUTE 1999, at 277, 279 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course, Handbook Series
No. 1112, 1999); Diane E. Ambler, Roundtable on the Role of Independent Investment
Company Directors: Issues for Independent Directors of Bank-Related Funds, Variable
Insurance Product Funds, and Closed-End Funds, 55 Bus. LAw. 205, 233 (1999).
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2. SHORTCOMINGS AND POTENTIAL REMEDIES
The Bundesverband Deutscher Investmentgesellschaften [German
Investment Company Institute] ("BVI") was initially open-minded
about including Investment-AGs in the KAGG. However, during
the hearings leading to the enactment of the FMFG, the BVI ex-
pressed wariness regarding several points of the amendment.12
The BVI's concerns were ignored.
2.1. Discount after IPO ("Market Discount Phenomenon")
The BVI's main criticism of the Investment-AG focuses on a
pricing phenomenon that is well known in the United States. An
empirical study by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC")13 shows that, immediately after their initial public offering
("IPO"), shares in closed-end funds have a tendency to trade at a
discount to the fund's NAV (a so-called "market discount phe-
nomenon"). 14 This is the reason why few, if any, traditional closed-
end funds have been issued in the United States in recent years.
Because of the market discount phenomenon, the BVI rejected
the creation of dosed-end funds partially out of fear of being ac-
cused by the media of conducting some kind of "Cheating
Scheme." The BVI feared that, based on the following analysis, the
market discount phenomenon could also occur in Germany.
Under section 63, KAGG, paragraph 2, an investment company
must offer its shares to the public at a price that corresponds to the
investment company's NAV per share plus a markup for transac-
tion expenses specified in the investment company's articles of as-
12 Statement on the FMFG, public hearing of the financing committee of No-
vember 12, 1997, Finanzausschuss Drucksache no. 510, 13th election period, Pro-
tocol no. 93.
13 Study by the Office of Economic Analysis, SEC, The Post-Offering Price
Performance of Closed-End Funds 0uly 21, 1989); see also KAI-UWE STECK,
REGULIERUNG VON US-AMERIKANISCHEN INVESTMENTGESELLSCHAFTEN 78 (2000) (de-
scribing the empirical study).
14 In 1997, approximately seventy-one percent of the closed-end funds in the
United States were traded at a discount. In 1996 that number had grown to
eighty-three percent of all funds. The average discount amounted to 6.87%. In
extreme cases, the discount amounted to thirty percent.
At times of falling interest rates, some closed-end funds, such as bond funds,
have traded at a premium to NAV. Closed-end funds also may trade at a pre-
mium if the fund manager has an exceptional record or if the fund provides an
indirect way of investing in "private investments" or underlying "hedge funds"
that would not otherwise be available.
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sociation. The NAV per share15 is derived by dividing the net
value of the investment company's assets by the number of issued
shares.16 After the investment company sells its shares in an IPO,
free market forces determine the trading price of the shares. It may
be that shortly after the IPO, the same share representing the same
NAV per share (ceteris panbus) may be available on the market at a
price far below the IPO price.' 7 If this market discount phenome-
non were to appear in Germany, the initial subscribers, who
bought at the IPO price, would be in for an unpleasant surprise.
Whether this justifies the accusation of a "Cheating Scheme" or not
shall be left open at this point. In any case, the industry would
need to defend against the accusations.
2.1.1. Market Discount Phenomenon Causes
There are several possible causes for the market discount phe-
nomenon. For instance, investors may discount the transaction ex-
pense markup that is included in the IPO price, 8 or investors may
have a general aversion against investing in companies, such as
closed-end funds, that have a small market-capitalization. 19 Ac-
cording to one treatise,20 the market discount is not related to the
quality of the management. But, as previously noted, some funds
15 According to section 63, KAGG, paragraph 3, the NAV is generally to be
determined at least once a week and to be published in a sufficiently available
business or newspaper without undue delay.
16 This provision is comparable to the special provisions for the issuance of
shares in special security asset pools. See § 21, KAGG.
17 There are indications that so-called "vultures" in the United States have
specialized in the taking over of funds of this type by acquiring a majority of the
fund at a discount and liquidating it. The goal of these transactions is to gain
cheap access to the portfolio of a closed-end fund below its intrinsic value.
1s Periodic Repurchases by Closed-End Management Investment Companies;
Redemptions by Open-End Management Investment Companies and Registered
Separate Accounts at Periodic Intervals or with Extended Payment, Exchange Act
Release Nos. 33-6948, 34-30967, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,022 (uly 28,1992).
19 Wendell M. Faria, The Regulation of Closed-End Investment Companies, in
NuTs & BOLTS OF FINANCIAL PRODUCrS, at 293,311 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course,
Handbook Series No. 975,1999).
20 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian
Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L.
REv. 985, 1005 (1993). U.S. investor protection representatives have different
opinions. See, e.g., Craig Karmin, Holder Activists Get a Whole Lot Of Shakin' Goin'
On at Closed-Ends, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1999, available at 1999 WL-WSJ 24916362
(discussing the rights of activist shareholders in the United States).
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do trade at a premium if the fund's manager has an exceptional
track record.
Due to the IPO pricing procedures set forth in section 63,
KAGG, paragraph 2, the IPO price cannot reflect subjective criteria,
such as the quality of management. Under section 63, the IPO
price is based only on the actual value of the fund's assets and the
transaction expense markup. Any additional factors such as the
investment experience, previous investment success, investment
strategy, and the composition of the fund's management are not
taken into account. Furthermore, the IPO price cannot reflect the
composition and performance of the supervisory bodies, the in-
vestor structure, the range of the offered services, and the market-
ing abilities of an Investment-AG. But all of these factors will be
reflected in the market price when the value of the shares is no
longer based on section 63, KAGG but is instead determined by the
market. Even though the market price will not be completely un-
coupled from the fund's intrinsic asset value, it will not be directly
tied to the fund's NAV.21 In this respect, the market price for
shares of an Investment-AG does not differ from a conventional
stock corporation's share price. The market price anticipates all in-
fluencing factors both positive and negative under transparent
market conditions. The legislators anticipated that the market
price for a share of an Investment-AG may not equal the Invest-
ment-AG's NAV per share. Accordingly, section 62, KAGG, para-
graph 2, requires that the stock market prospectus state that the
shares' NAV generally differs from its market price.
Section 64, KAGG, paragraph 1 permits an Investment-AG to
repurchase its own shares as part of a price management measure
if the shares' market price falls below ninety percent of its NAV.
However, this repurchase right is unable to neutralize the market
discount phenomenon when the discount is smaller.
We propose that the German federal government consider
further amending the KAGG to permit Investment-AGs greater
ability to repurchase their own shares as a method of counteracting
21 On the other hand, both the issue price and redemption price of open-end
funds are determined by the open-end fund's NAV. According to section 21,
KAGG, paras. 2 and 5, the redemption price of an open-end fund corresponds to
the NAV per share, as determined by the deposit bank. The NAV per share is de-
rived by dividing the NAV of the fund by the number of shares outstanding. The
fund's NAV is determined every trading day based on the market prices of the
fund's securities, subscription rights, and option rights plus the value of the
fund's other assets and minus any loans or other liabilities of the fund.
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the market discount phenomenon. The German federal govern-
ment can find support for these measures from the effects of a
regulatory provision22 adopted by the SEC in the United States.
23
In 1992, the SEC adopted Rule 23c-3 under the U.S. Investment
Company Act of 1940 that permits certain closed-end funds to offer
to repurchase its own shares at NAV every three, six, or twelve
months and that permits all conventional closed-end funds to offer
to repurchase its shares at NAV once every two years.24 Closed-
end funds that engage in these repurchase transactions are known
as closed-end interval funds or hybrid funds.25
2.1.2. IPO at Market Conditions
Another question is whether or not the statutory pricing proce-
dure can be replaced by a market-oriented procedure such as book
building.
According to the legislative history of the FMFG, section 63,
KAGG, paragraph 2 incorporates the guiding principle of all in-
vestment funds in that the price at which an investment fund offers
its shares, at least in the case of a public offering, must correspond
22 Repurchase Offers By Closed-end Companies, 17 C.F.R. § 270.23c-3 (2001).
23 It has been said
[t]hat flexibility narrows the gap between the value of the WEBS [World
Equity Benchmark Shares] and the underlying shares, or its net asset
value .... Shares of closed-end funds often trade at a discount .... [A]n
ongoing share-buyback program immediately lifted the per-share net-
asset value and shrank the fund's discount. The buybacks, which began
in October 2000, have helped raise the fund's share price by more than
fifty percent.
Craig Karmin, More-Efficient WEBS Provide Alternative to Closed-End Funds, WALL
ST. J., July 6,1999, at R12, available at 1999 WL-WSJ 5459197; see also Ambler, supra
note 11, at 234-37 (providing critical comment).
24 Periodic Repurchases by Closed-End Management Investment Companies;
Redemptions by Open-End Management Investment Companies and Registered
Separate Accounts at Periodic Intervals or with Extended Payment, Exchange Act
Release Nos. 33-6948, 34-30967, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,022 (uly 28, 1992). For details on the variants not discussed hereinafter, see
THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., 1 REGULATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES § 4.04 6 (1998);
MCMILLAN, supra note 11 at 286-94; STECK, supra note 13, at 74.
25 On this subject Michael Berenson, The Status of the Investment Company Act
Study, in A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONFERENCE ON LIFE INS. COMPANY PRODUCTS: CURRENT
SEC., TAX, ERISA, AND ST. REG. ISsUES 61, 68 (1997); Elizabeth G. Osterman, Distri-
bution, Resale, and Repurchase of Securities by Closed-End and Open-End Hybrid In-
vestment Companies, A.L.I.-A.B.A. INVESrMENT CoMPANY REG. & COMPLIANCE 189,
195 (1997).
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to the intrinsic value allocable to the shares on the day that the in-
vestment fund accepts the public's unconditional subscription of-
fers.26 If section 63, KAGG, paragraph 2 is questioned, the guiding
principle of investment funds appears to be undermined. But the
legislators created the Investment-AG as a new investment vehicle,
at least in Germany, which may possibly require its own guiding
principle.
Persuading the legislative authorities to accept a market-
oriented pricing procedure would require establishing sufficiently
strong arguments to counteract the guiding principles currently in
place. Under transparent issuing conditions, investors would be
able to take into account criteria mentioned above regarding the
fund's management, investment strategy, controlling mechanisms,
and service, in addition to the intrinsic value of the initial assets of
the fund. In most cases, the IPO price would not correspond to the
intrinsic value of the fund's assets plus transaction expenses.
However, it may not necessarily end up below that price. A ques-
tion that should still be asked is: who would eventually bear the
discount if, in spite of a market-oriented pricing procedure, the
IPO price was below the NAV plus transaction costs? The answer
to this question may be illustrated by looking at the incorporation
procedure of an Investment-AG. Pursuant to section 51, KAGG,
paragraph 5, an Investment-AG receives its operating license
within the meaning of section 51, KAGG, paragraph 1 only if the
paid-in registered capital amounts to at least EURO 1 million, the
Investment-AG has its registered office in Germany, the managers
are reliable and are qualified to lead the company, the articles
stipulate that the fund may carry out only those activities listed in
section 51, KAGG, paragraph 3 as well as immediately related an-
cillary activities, the articles correspond to the requirements of sec-
tion 15, KAGG regarding the conditions of contract, and the In-
vestment-AG has commissioned a deposit bank in accordance with
the requirements of section 12, KAGG.
This shows that a stock corporation has to be incorporated or
be in existence first (first step) before it may apply for an operating
license (second step).27 If the operating license is granted, at least
26 For arguments favoring the FMFG, see BT-Drucks 13/8933, 130; § 21,
KAGG, para. 1, sentence 1.
27 The license application already has to contain corresponding information
and documentation pursuant to section 51, KAGG, paragraph 4, in connection
with section 32, Kreditwesengesetz, para. 1, sentence 2 [Banking Act], v. 9.9.1998
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ninety percent of the investment shares have to be publicly offered
within six months (third step).28 According to section 51, KAGG,
paragraph 6, the operating license may be revoked by the Federal
Banking Supervisory Office (BAKred) if, within twelve months af-
ter such license has been granted, less than seventy-five percent of
the Investment-AG's issued shares have been floated. The statute
lists two non-exclusive examples that meet the requirements for a
public offer: either a third party enters into an agreement with the
Investment-AG's shareholders to offer their shares to the public,29
or the Investment-AG's founders conduct a corresponding capital
increase while waiving their own subscription right.30
2.1.2.1. Redistnrbution
In practice, the first case involves a redistribution using an un-
derwriting syndicate. The incorporators, most of whom in practice
will be financial intermediaries, sell at least ninety percent of their
original shares to the public. The underwriting banks operate as
brokers based on a brokerage agreement pursuant to Buergerliches
Gesetzbuch [German Civil Code] ("BGB")31 or acquire the original
shares in order to sell these in their own name.
3 2
If, irrespective of the KAGG's statutory pricing procedure, the
underwriting syndicate resells the shares at a price below the NAV
per share, the former shareholders would bear the discount instead
of the fund. The Investment-AG does not receive any new capital
during the redistribution. It would be a contractual issue between
the selling shareholders and the fund as to who will bear the trans-
actional expenses relating to the underwriting.33 Nonetheless, the
(BGB1. I S.2776) [hereinafter KWG]. A smooth licensing process generally lasts
for three to four months after filing, i.e., brochure by the BVI for establishing a
Kapitalanlagegesellschaft.
28 § 61, KAGG, para. 1. As already stated, the public offer requires a prior
stock exchange registration. See discussion, supra note 7. The exchange registra-
tion in turn requires a previous publication of the IPO prospectus pursuant to
section 62, KAGG.
29 § 61, KAGG, para. 2, no. 1.
30 § 61 KAGG, para. 2, no. 2.
31 Bilgerliches Gesetzbuch [German Civil Code], v. 18.8.1896 (RGB1 S.195), as
amended.
32 Ulrich Bosch & Wolfgang Gross, in 5 BANKRECHT UND BANKPRAXIS, supra
note 7, at no. 10/288.
33 The prohibition of contribution repayment (§ 57, AktG, para. 1) in the form
of payment to a third party (nonshareholder) for account of the shareholder must
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guiding principle for investment savings is not violated by redis-
tribution at market prices. Pursuant to this guiding principle, the
shares' issue price has to be equal to the intrinsic value of the
shares on the day on which the Investment-AG accepts the public's
non-conditional subscription offers. During the redistribution,
however, the Investment-AG is not accepting the public's sub-
scription offers. Only the selling shareholders commit themselves
to transfer a certain number of their shares. The Investment-AG is
generally not involved.34 Consequently, the statutory pricing pro-
cedure protects the selling shareholders against market-related
price risks but does not ensure adequate capital inflow for the In-
vestment-AG. Conversely, an issue price that was not formed by
the market increases the placement risk on the selling sharehold-
ers.
2.1.2.2. Capital Increase with Subscription Right Exclusion
In the second case mentioned above, the founders keep their
original shares. With the founders' approval during a sharehold-
ers' meeting, the capital is increased by ninety percent while sub-
scription rights are excluded35 so that public investors eventually
subscribe to the new shares. 36
After passing the capital increase resolution pursuant to section
182, AktG, paragraph 1, and filing the resolution for registration
with the commercial register, pursuant to section 184, AktG, the
fund finalizes the agreement with the new subscribers. This sub-
scription agreement is created by a written declaration-subscrip-
tion certificate pursuant to section 185, AktG, paragraph 1-in
which the subscribers submit an offer to the fund to acquire a cer-
tain number of shares at a certain price, as well as the fund's sub-
sequent acceptance of this offer. This subscription agreement es-
tablishes the subscriber's obligation to pay the capital
contribution.37
be observed. See Marcus Lutter, in KOLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENRECHT § 57,
no. 43 (Wolfgang Z611ner ed., 2nd ed. 1988).
34 However, the company could become a party of the purchase agreement
for liability purposes. See Bosch & Gross, supra note 32, at no. 10/293.
35 See § 65, KAGG in connection with sections 182 & 186, para. 3, sentences 1-
3 Aktiengesetz [German Stock Corporation Act], v. 6.9.1965 (BGBl. I S.1089) [here-
inafter AktG].
36 BT-Drucks 13/8933, 129 (providing government arguments for § 61,
KAGG).
37 KAI-MICHAEL SCHANZ, BORSENEINFOHRUNG § 9, no. 40 (2000).
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In a normal public stock offering in Germany, a banking syndi-
cate commits itself to subscribe to the shares for its own account
and then resells these to the public.3 s The subscription and place-
ment obligation arises from an underwriting agreement between
the issuer and the syndicated banks. 39 The syndicated banks gen-
erally subscribe to the new shares at their nominal amount. The
difference (additional proceeds or markup) between nominal
amount/subscription price4° and the subsequent issue price of the
floated shares is paid out to the issuer by the syndicated banks due
to a contractual obligation in the underwriting agreement.41 It
should be noted that, according to section 9, AktG, paragraph 1,
shares may not be issued below their nominal amount or the pro-
portional amount of the registered capital allocable to an individ-
ual unit share. This corresponds to the lowest issue price pursuant
to section 36a, AktG, paragraph 1. It differs from the collected
amount pursuant to section 36, AktG, paragraph 2, which has to
amount to at least twenty-five percent of the lowest issue price.
According to section 188, AktG, paragraph 2, and section 36, AktG,
paragraph 2, a filing for a completed capital increase may only be
made after the collected amount has been paid in for each share.
This conventional procedure is only partially useful when
floating investment shares. Pursuant to section 63, KAGG, para-
graph 1, shares may be issued only against full payment of the is-
sue price. Because of this special statutory provision, no collected
33 Since the shares of an Investment-AG have to be registered for official list-
ing or trading on the regulated market (see § 61, KAGG, para. 3) the cooperation
of underwriting managers is compulsory. See § 36, B6rsengesetz, para. 2 [German
Stock Exchange Act], v. 9.9.1998 (BGB1. I S.2682) [hereinafter B~rsG], in connec-
tion with § 13, B6rsenzulassungsverordnung, para. 1, sentence 5 [German Stock
Exchange Admission Regulation], v. 9.9.1998 (BGB1. I S.2832) [hereinafter BSr-
sZulV and § 71, B6rsG, para. 2; see also WOLFGANG GROSS, KAPITALMARKTRECHT,
KOMMENTAR ZUM BC)RSG/BORSZULV/VERKPROSG/VERKPROSV 120, no. 4 & 214,
no. 7 (2000) (stating that an underwriting is mandatory); THOMAS LEDERMANN, in
KOMMENTAR ZUM WPHG/BCRSG/VERKPIOSG/B~rsG § 71 no. 4 (Frank A. Schafer
ed., 1999).
39 For details, see UTA FREDEBEIL, AKrIENEMISSIONEN 181 (2002); SCHANZ, supra
note 37, § 9, no. 47; Bosch & Gross, supra note 32, at no. 10/294; Gerhard Picot &
Volker Land, Going Public-Typische Rechtsfragen des Ganges an die Blrse, DER
BErRIEB 570, 571 (1999); Konstantin Technau, Rechtsfragen bei der Gestaltung von
Olbernahmevertrdgen ("underwriting agreement") im Zusammenhang mit Aktienemis-
sionen, DIE AKrIENGESELLSCHAFT, 445,446 (1998).
40 The issue price is the price that the subscribing shareholder promises to
pay as contribution. See Karsten Heider, in MONcHKoMM/AKTG, § 9, no. 8 (2nd
ed. 2000).
41 SCHANZ, supra note 37, § 9, no. 49; Picot & Land, supra note 39, at 572.
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amount pursuant to section 36, AktG, paragraph 2 comprising only
twenty-five percent of the lowest issue price exists, even though
section 65, KAGG refers to section 188, AktG, paragraph 2 without
restriction. The purpose of the full payment provision is to ensure
that the company's assets are fully covered by equity.42
The question arises as to which contribution the syndicated
banks, as the first subscribers, have to provide. The above-
mentioned lowest issue price pursuant to section 36a, AktG, para-
graph 1 cannot be decisive even though section 65, KAGG also re-
fers to section 36a, AktG, paragraph 1 through section 188, AktG,
paragraph 2. It is irrelevant whether or not the syndicated banks
have to contribute an amount equal to the proportional NAV pur-
suant to section 63, KAGG, paragraph 2, sentence 2, since they sub-
scribe based on the Investment-AG's public share offer; in this
case, the issue price would be determined by section 63, KAGG,
paragraph 2, sentence 1.43 As the special provision, section 65,
KAGG, no. 2 provides that the issue price44 of the shares issued
during a capital increase may not be less than the proportional
NAV pursuant to section 63, KAGG, paragraph 2, sentence 2. Due
to the lack of a reference to section 63, KAGG, paragraph 2, sen-
tence 1, a transaction expense markup is not required. The word-
ing "not be less," however, permits a corresponding markup.
Accordingly, particularities apply during the issuance of new
investment shares compared to the conventional underwriting
process under the direction of a banking syndicate. The fundrais-
ing and the risks involved should be noted. The following case
demonstrates this. Assume that an existing stock corporation has
net assets of 200 monetary units ("MU"), a registered capital of 100
MU, and the founders hold 100 shares with a nominal value of 1
MU per share. The registered capital is now increased by ninety
percent, i.e., 90 MU, and the subscription right is excluded. Now
assume that the underwriting banking syndicate subscribes to all
the additional shares, which also have a nominal value of 1 MU per
share, in order to sell these to the public afterwards at the best pos-
sible price. According to the conventional process, the syndicated
banks would have to pay only the collected amount of 22.5 MU
(twenty-five percent of the lowest issue price, Y = 90 MIU) after
42 BT-Drucks 13/8933, 130 (providing government arguments on § 61,
KAGG).
43 See supra Section 2.1.1.
44 The unofficial heading imprecisely states a "Minimum Price."
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subscribing. At the same time, they would commit themselves in
the underwriting agreement to pay the corporation any additional
proceeds they receive from reselling the shares.
On the other hand, under the special investment provisions,
the syndicated banks would need to pay the corporation the full
issue price per share, which may not be less than the current NAV
per share. This value can be derived by dividing the Investment-
AG's net assets (200 MU) by the number of outstanding shares
(100). Thus, the syndicated banks have to contribute to the corpo-
ration a total of 180 MU (2 MU per share x 90 shares = 180 MU).
This example not only illustrates that the underwriting banks have
to provide a comparably large amount of capital from the begin-
ning but also that their subscription commitment constitutes an
additional hardship if the placement risk materializes, and they are
not able to resell all of the shares to the public.45
All of this shows how the statutory pricing procedure set forth
in section 63, KAGG, paragraph 2, sentence 1 is unnecessary.
Taking into account the purpose of the statute, there is no justifica-
tion for this provision. The overriding purpose of requiring the is-
sue price to be equal to the shares' intrinsic value is already
achieved by section 65, KAGG, no. 2. Requiring the underwriting
banks to subscribe at a price equal to, at least, the proportional
NAV pursuant to the provision does not cause any dilution.
Section 63, KAGG, paragraph 2, sentence 1 should no longer be de-
cisive if the underwriting banks intend to resell the investment
shares after their fixed acceptance. The wording of this statute re-
lates to the day on which the Investment-AG accepts the public's
offers. In reality, the Investment-AG only accepts subscription of-
fers from the underwriting banks. It should also be noted that the
term "publicly offered" pursuant to section 63, KAGG, paragraph
2, sentence 1 generally does not conform to the system. Unlike the
Auslandinvestmentgesetz [German Foreign Investment Company
Act] ("AuslInvestmG), 46 which does not follow an organizational,
45 On the problematic question of reversal, which is not discussed here, see
SCHANZ, supra note 37, § 9 no. 54; Picot & Land, supra note 39, at 573; Technau, su-
pra note 39, at 452.
46 For information on the differentiation between private placement and
public distribution, see § 1, para. 1, § 7, para. 1, § 8, para. I Auslandinvestmentge-
setz [German Foreign Investment Company Act], v. 9.9.1998 (BGB1. I S.2820)
[hereinafter AIG]; see also KURT PETER DITrRicH, DIE PRIVATPLAZIERUNG IM
DEUTSCHEN KAPITALMARKTRECHT 35 (1998) (providing references to the corre-
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but rather, a capital market law approach,47 the differentiation
between a public offer and a private placement of investment cer-
tificates is irrelevant under the KAGG.48 The law does not provide
for a private placement of investment shares that is not based on
the proportional NAV.
Accordingly, the Investment-AG receives the proceeds from
the capital increase-based issue, because the underwriting banks
have to subscribe to the Investment-AG's new shares at their pro-
portional NAV. To be on the safe side, a transaction cost markup
should be provided. The shares of the original shareholders are
therefore not diluted. We believe that the underwriting banks do
not have to resell the shares to the public at their proportionate
NAV, since section 63, KAGG, paragraph 2, sentence 1 does not
apply, based either on its purpose or its wording. Thus, the cur-
rent legal situation does not prevent market-oriented pricing by the
underwriting banks. By taking into account all value-determining
factors, which are soon thereafter also discounted by the market
price, the market discount phenomenon can be counteracted. Even
an intentional "underpricing" is possible.
Admittedly, it is not obvious why an underwriting syndicate
that subscribed for investment shares at NAV would intentionally
resell the investment shares at a lower price. A typical underwrit-
ing manager would pass on a deal like this due to the imminent
losses. Preventing the market discount phenomenon would not
constitute a sufficient incentive. What we are dealing with in this
case is not a typical underwriting transaction where the partici-
pating banks generate profits through transaction fees and com-
missions. Instead, the underwriting is only a means to the end of
establishing an Investment-AG according to the statutory require-
ments, even if it may be a loss-generating activity in the short term.
Experience in the United States shows that profits with dosed-
end funds are generated not during their creation but only over the
long term as management fees.49 The investment advisor, who is
often a founder of the closed-end fund, constitutes the company's
sponding statement of the BAKred on the public distribution of foreign invest-
ment shares); PAUL & PASLER, supra note 10, introduction no. 133 (same).
47 See DITTRICH, supra note 46, at 99; Klaus Hopt, Vom Aktien-und Bdrsenrecht
zum Kapitalmarktrecht? 141 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAmTE HANELSRECHT UND
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 389, 398 (1977).
48 DIrTRICH, supra note 46, at 100.
49 This also applies to open-end funds.
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actual management body. After a resale of the shares or a capital
increase, the advisor is only linked to the investment company by
an advisory contract, which, among other things, regulates the
management fees. 50 The advisory contract has always been at the
core of the U.S. Investment Company Act of 1940.
Underwriters will be willing to subscribe to investment shares
pursuant to the above-mentioned conditions if they themselves, or
one of their subsidiaries, are offered a lucrative long-term advisory
contract for managing the portfolio as compensation for the risks
and expenses involved in managing the underwriting.
The incentive for a financial intermediary to set up an Invest-
ment-AG is the prospect of moving to the position of an invest-
ment advisor. Otherwise, management fees cannot be generated
over the long term. It is not efficient to set up a portfolio manager
for each Investment-AG. Experience shows that centralizing the
management of several closed-end funds creates synergies ("exter-
nalization of management"). Therefore, closed-end funds in the
United States rely on extensive back-office services by third-party
investment advisors. The advisors can only secure their long-term
influence through a specially drafted advisory contract, because
the alternative position as a manager, and therefore representative
body of the company, involves too many corporate law imponder-
ables in Germany.5'
It is remarkable that the German legislators did not include a
statutory provision concerning the advisory contract. The legisla-
tive materials indicate that this traditional core area was over-
looked. On one hand, this allows for a lot of leeway when drafting
individual advisory agreements with respect to compensation,
term, and termination periods. On the other hand, legislators were
unable to anticipate the legal consequences, which result from the
reference in section 51, KAGG, paragraph 4 to select KWG. Ac-
cording to section 25a, KWG, paragraph 2, the outsourcing to an-
other enterprise of operational areas that is essential for conducting
banking business must not impair the orderliness of such busi-
50 For details, see STEcK, supra note 13, at 89, 92.
51 Only an individual with full legal capacity may be appointed as a member
of the management board pursuant to section 76, AktG, paragraph 3, sentence 1.
The dispersed composition of the shareholder base may lead to a vote of no confi-
dence and a revocation of the appointment to the management board as a conse-
quence. See § 84, AktG, para. 3; HANS-JOAcHIM MERTENS, in KbLNER KOMMENTAR
ZUM AKIENREci-rr § 84 no. 43 (2d ed. 1996).
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ness.5 2 This statute53 probably limits an economically meaningful
outsourcing. If an extreme outsourcing by an Investment-AG is
not permitted because of it, the execution of an advisory contract
providing comprehensive management services becomes unneces-
sary. Accordingly, no incentive would exist for a financial inter-
mediary to establish an Investment-AG.
2.2. Permitted Portfolio
Pursuant to section 58, KAGG, paragraph 1, an Investment-AG
may invest up to twenty percent of its equity in shares that are not
officially listed on a stock exchange or traded on another kind of
organized market. It may furthermore acquire silent participations
pursuant to section 58, KAGG, paragraph 2, sentence 1, if this kind
of investment is permitted by the Investment-AG's articles and the
acquisition cost at the time of acquisition together with the book
value of silent participations already held by the Investment-AG
do not exceed fifty percent of the Investment-AG's equity. Any
shares already acquired pursuant to section 58, KAGG, paragraph
1 are to be included in the calculation of this acquisition limit.5 4 As
a result, the portion of assets with low liquidity and valuation risks
is limited to a maximum of fifty percent of the assets of an Invest-
ment-AG.55
On one hand, Investment-AGs have greater flexibility in their
activities than open-end security funds-§ 8, KAGG- or participa-
tion funds - § 25a, KAGG.56 On the other hand, one may disagree
52 PAUL & PASLER, supra note 10, introduction no. 9 (discussing outsourcing of
areas of the KAGG business).
53 Introduced by Article 1 of the Act for the Implementation of EU-Directives
on the Harmonization of Banking and Securities Law Provisions, v. 22.10.1997
(BGB1. I S.2518) ("6. KWG-Novelle, 01.01.1998"); Theodor Baums & Kai-Uwe
Steck, Bausparkassen als Konzernt6chter, in WERTPAPIERMITTEILUNG 2261, 2264 (1998);
Uwe Eyles, Funktionsauslagerung (outsourcing) bei Kredit-und Finanzdienstleistung-
sinstituten, in WERTPAPIERMITTEILUNG 1217 (2000); Herbert Zerwas & Mathias
Hanten, outsourcing bei Kredit- und Finanzinstituten, in WERTPAPIERMITTEILUNG 1110
(1998).
54 § 58, KAGG, para. 2, sentence 1.
5 BAUR, supra note 3, § 18, no. 35; cf. PAUL & PASLER, supra note 10, introduc-
tion no. 81 (stating investment restrictions for the assets eligible for the portfolio).
56 Pursuant to section 8, KAGG, paragraph 2, only ten percent of the value of
a special security pool may be invested in securities that are not registered for of-
ficial trade on a stock exchange or participate in another organized market. Also,
silent participations may be acquired for a special security pool pursuant to sec-
tion 25b, KAGG, paragraph 3, only to the extent that at the time of their acquisi-
tion their value together with the value of the silent participations already held by
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on whether or not the investment restrictions for Investment-AGs
are too stringent for the creation of funds that function as venture
capital or other private equity sources. German venture companies
requiring capital are rarely exchange-listed stock corporations.
Corresponding to the German corporate landscape, it is mainly
limited liability companies ("GmbH') and partnerships that re-
quire venture capital.57 Conventional participations in such com-
panies are generally excluded as permitted investment objects for
Investment-AGs. Investment-AGs may therefore participate in
German startups that are structured as a GmbH or partnership
only in the form of a silent participation pursuant to section 230 of
the Handelsgesetzbuch [German Commercial Code] ("HGB").58 Ac-
cordingly, the catalog of permitted investments needs to be ex-
panded.
2.3. Taxation
2.3.1. Initial Situation
Section 55, KAGG contains no reference to the special tax stat-
utes for open-end investment funds,59 so the general tax provisions
for stock corporations also apply to Investment-AGs. In particular,
the provisions of the KAGG providing tax exemptions for certain
distributed profits (i.e., capital gains from the sale of securities, in-
come from the sale of subscription rights for shares in stock corpo-
rations, § 40, KAGG) are not applicable to Investment-AGs. In
contrast to open-end funds, which are generally exempt from cor-
porate income tax and trade tax pursuant to section 38, KAGG,
paragraph 1, only the tax credit procedure applies to Investment-
AGs, thus, making them subject to corporate income tax and trade
tax, and they need to rely on the tax credit procedures to alleviate
these taxes. 60
the special securities pool does not exceed thirty percent of the value of the special
securities pool.
57 See generally on venture capital financing Theodor Baums & Matthias
M6ler, Venture Capital: US-amerikanisches Modell und deutsches Aktienrecht, in
FEsrscHRIFr BUXBAUM 33 (2000).
M Handelsgesetzbuch [German Commercial Code], v. 10.5.1897 (RGB1.
S.219), as amended.
59 See § 37n, KAGG.
60 BAUR, supra note 3, § 18, no. 33; PAUL & PASLER, supra note 10, introduction
no. 83. On the credit procedure, see for example, GERRIT FROTSCHER, in
K6RPERScHAFTsTEUERGEsFrz [KStG], before § 27, no. 1 (Gerrit Frotscher & Ernst
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2.3.2. Improvements due to the Recent German Tax Reform
(UrefSenkG)
Recently, this initial tax situation, which is considered a major
disadvantage of Investment-AGs, changed significantly. The Un-
ternehmenssteuerreform- und Steuersenkungsgesetz [Corporate Tax Re-
form and Tax Reduction Act] ("UrefSenkG") 61 abolished the tax
credit procedure. Beginning in 2002, all capital gains, from the
sales of shares in incorporated enterprises that are held as operat-
ing assets, will not be included when calculating the income of a
corporation, association, or asset pool according to the new version
of section 8b, paragraph 2, sentence 1 of the Koerperschaftsteuerge-
setz [Corporation Tax Act] ("KStG").62 While there is a minimum
participation requirement, the shares have to be held for at least
one year. The tax-free exchange of shares will also generally be
possible internationally.63 Consequently, the tax disadvantage-
based reservations against Investment-AGs that generate their in-
come mainly by acquiring participations and selling them at a
profit will be at least somewhat alleviated by the UrefSenkG.
3. CONCLUSION
From an economic point of view, the Investment-AG's exis-
tence is justified as a productive venture capital source with a reli-
able degree of investor protection. It should therefore be under-
stood as an investment alternative in an efficient and functioning
financial market and not as competition for conventional open-end
investment companies.
The legal framework for Investment-AGs still leaves much to
be desired. In particular, the statutorily prescribed pricing proce-
dure is ambiguous. The legislators took up the traditional idea of
Maas eds., 1999) (describing the tax credit procedures); MANFRED MOsSNER ET AL.,
KORPERSCHAFTSTEUERGESETZ [KStG], § 27, no. 1 (Gerrit Frotscher & Ernst Maas
eds., 1999) (same).
61 Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung des Untemehmensteuerrechts [Corporate Tax
Reform and Tax Reduction Act], v. 24.12.2001 (BGBI. I S.3858) [hereinafter Uref-
SenkG].
62 K6rperschaftsteuergesetz [Corporation Tax Act], v. 22.4.1999 (BGB1. I
S.817) [hereinafter KStG]; Ewald Doetsch & Alexander Pung, Die Anderungen bei
der Kdrperschaftsteuer und bei der Anteilseignebesteuerung, DER BETRIEB, annex no. 10,
8 (2000); Rainer Heurung et al., Anwendungs- und Zweifelfragen im Rahmen der Steu-
ereforn, BETRIEBSBERATER 181, 184 (2001).
63 Hartmut Winkler, DStZ Aktuel (Gesetzebung), DEUTSCHE STEUER ZEITSCHRIFT
73,74 (2000).
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investment saving, according to which the shares' issue price must
correspond with the intrinsic value on the day that the Investment-
AG accepts the public's unconditional subscription offers. But cur-
rently, during an IPO, a market-oriented pricing procedure and
possibly an "underpricing" may become necessary, since it con-
stitutes the only way to avoid the industry-feared investor shock
due to the scientifically proven market discount phenomenon. The
literal and intentional interpretations of section 63, KAGG,
paragraph 2, sentence 1 and section 65, KAGG, no. 2 still permits a
market-oriented pricing procedure based on the current law. The
underwriting banks, however, have to be willing to subscribe un-
conditionally and pay an issue price that does not fall short of the
Investment-AG's current NAV per share. Furthermore, it should
be considered whether or not the hybrid U.S. fund model, which
combines the characteristics of the traditional open-end and closed-
end funds, should be implemented into German investment law.
When the Investment-AG was included in the KAGG, German
legislators did not provide for the so-called "advisory contract."
This contract, however, is the basis on which investment advisors
may generate any management fees with funds of this kind. The
advisory contract is also the only incentive for the underwriting
syndicate to establish an Investment-AG while observing all of the
particularities of investment law and to take it public.
The investment limits for Investment-AGs set out in the in-
vestment laws require some improvement. Due to Germany's cor-
porate landscape, it is mainly GmbHs and partnerships that re-
quire venture capital. An Investment-AG, however, may acquire
an equity participation in them only in the form of a silent partici-
pation pursuant to section 230, HGB.
With respect to taxation, Investment-AGs have always been at
a disadvantage to open-end investment funds. UrefSenkG, how-
ever, abolishes the tax credit system. As of 2002, German corpora-
tions will not be taxed on their capital gains from the sale of share-
holdings of other corporations. This leads to a significant
improvement of the tax environment for Investment-AGs.
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